| 2011 Lecture 4: Platonism as a Way of Life |
Fourth and final lecture in the 2011 John Locke lecture series. |
John Cooper |
6 July, 2011 |
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| 2011 Lecture 3: The Stoic Way of Life |
Third lecture in the 2011 John Locke Lecture Series. |
John Cooper |
6 July, 2011 |
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| 2011 Lecture 2: Aristotle's Philosophy as Two Ways of Life |
Second lecture in the 2011 John Locke Lecture Series. |
John Cooper |
6 July, 2011 |
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| 2011 Lecture 1: Philosophy in Antiquity as a Way of Life |
Part of the 2011 John Locke Lecture Series; this year presented by Professor John Cooper, Princeton University, on 'Ancient Greek Philosophies as a Way of Life'. |
John Cooper |
6 July, 2011 |
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| 2009 Lecture 5: Normative Structures |
Fifth and final lecture in the 2009 John Locke lectures entitled Being Realistic about Reasons. |
Thomas M Scanlon |
20 December, 2010 |
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| 2009 Lecture 4: Epistemological Problems |
Fourth lecture in the 2009 John Locke Lecture series entitled Being Realistic about Reasons. |
Thomas M Scanlon |
20 December, 2010 |
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| 2009 Lecture 3: Motivation and the Appeal of Expressivism |
Third lecture in the 2009 John Locke lecture series entitled Being Realistic about Reasons. |
Thomas M Scanlon |
20 December, 2010 |
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| 2009 Lecture 2: Normativity and Metaphysics |
Second lecture in the 2009 John Locke lectures entitled Being Realistic about Reasons. |
Thomas M Scanlon |
20 December, 2010 |
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| 2009 Lecture 1: Being Realistic about Reasons Introduction |
First lecture of the 2009 John Locke Lectures entitled 'Being Realistic about Reasons. |
Thomas M Scanlon |
20 December, 2010 |
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| 2010 Lecture 6: Whither the Aufbau? |
Sixth and final lecture in the John Locke lecture series entitled Constructing the World. |
David Chalmers |
15 December, 2010 |
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| 2010 Lecture 5: Hard Cases: Mathematics, Normativity, Ontology, Intentionality |
Fifth lecture in the 2010 John Locke lecture series entitled Constructing the World. |
David Chalmers |
15 December, 2010 |
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| 2010 Lecture 4: Revisability and Conceptual Change: Carnap vs. Quine |
Fourth lecture in the 2010 John Locke lecture series entitled Constructing the World. |
David Chalmers |
15 December, 2010 |
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| 2010 Lecture 3: The Case for A Priori Scrutability |
Third lecture in the 2010 John Locke lecture series entitled Constructing the World. |
David Chalmers |
15 December, 2010 |
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| 2010 Lecture 2: The Cosmoscope Argument |
Second lecture in the 2010 John Locke lecture series entitled 'Constructing the World'. |
David Chalmers |
15 December, 2010 |
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| 2010 Lecture 1: A Scrutable World |
First Lecture in the 2010 John Locke Lecture series entitled Constructing the World. |
David Chalmers |
15 December, 2010 |
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| 2008 Lecture 6: The Revisability Puzzle Revisited. |
This is the sixth lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 July, 2008 |
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| 2008 Lecture 5: Epistemology without Metaphysics |
This is the fifth lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 July, 2008 |
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| 2008 Lecture 4: Is that Really Revising Logic? |
This is the fourth lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 July, 2008 |
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| 2008 Lecture 3: A Case for the Rational Revisability of Logic. |
This is the third lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 July, 2008 |
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| 2008 Lecture 2: What is the Normative Role of Logic? |
This is the second lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 July, 2008 |
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| 2008 Lecture 1: A Puzzle about Rational Revisability |
This is the first lecture in the 2008 John Locke Lecture series entitled 'Logic, Normativity, and Rational Revisability'. |
Hartry Field |
24 July, 2008 |
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| 2007 Lecture 6: Knowing what we are thinking |
The sixth lecture will try to resolve a familiar tension between externalism about mental content and the assumption that we have some kind of privileged knowledge of the contents of our own thoughts. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 July, 2008 |
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| 2007 Lecture 5: Acquaintance and essence |
Russell held that we must be acquainted with the constituents of the contents of our thoughts, and remnants of this doctrine persist in the work of a number of more recent philosophers. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 July, 2008 |
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| 2007 Lecture 4: Phenomenal and epistemic indistinguishability |
The fourth lecture will begin with a variation on the thought experiment about Mary that is the focus of the knowledge argument, using it to develop the analogy between self-locating knowledge and knowledge of phenomenal experience. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 July, 2008 |
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| 2007 Lecture 3: Locating ourselves in the world |
One strategy for responding to the knowledge argument exploits an analogy between knowledge of phenomenal experience and essentially indexical or self-locating knowledge. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 July, 2008 |
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| 2007 Lecture 2: Epistemic possibilities and the knowledge argument |
The second lecture will begin with Frank Jackson's knowledge argument. The argument and the responses to it turn on assumptions about the nature of the contents of belief and the objects of knowledge. |
Robert Stalnaker |
10 July, 2008 |
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| 2007 Lecture 1: Starting in the middle |
Our topic is a subject's knowledge of his own phenomenal experience and of the content of his thought, but I will approach the topic from the outside, treating the subject as an object in the world. |
Robert Stalnaker |
26 June, 2008 |
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